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TAKE TWO TABLETS AND DO NOT CALL FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNTIL OUR HEADS
CLEAR: THE SUPREME COURT PREPARES TO
DEMOLISH THE “WALL OF SEPARATION”
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
Terence J. Lau∗
William A. Wines**
I. INTRODUCTION
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[] . . . . ” 1
“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and state.”2
“At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences
of the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may
count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional boundaries
has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private religious
exercise to flourish. . . . Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between
church and state must therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we
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1
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), in STEPHEN MANSFIELD, TEN
TORTURED WORDS: HOW THE FOUNDING FATHERS TRIED TO PROTECT RELIGION IN
AMERICA . . . AND WHAT’S HAPPENED SINCE 37 (2007) (emphasis added).

595

596

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

trade a system that has served us so well for one that has served others so
poorly?” 3
“We have built no temple but the Capitol. We consult no common
oracle but the Constitution.”4
“Preserve me, O God: for in thee do I put my trust.”5
Pleasant Grove, Utah’s “City of Trees[,]”6 is a nice place to raise a
family. Established by Mormon pioneers in 1850, it is now a prosperous
upper-middle class community, 93% white, with a median household
income of $70,000 and median home price of $247,900.7 Minor
inconveniences are easily overcome in Pleasant Grove. When town
founders felt the original name of the settlement, Battle Creek, was too
contentious, they readily agreed to the much more appealing “Pleasant
Grove.”8 When the town stopped growing strawberries, no one saw any
reason to stop the annual summer celebration of “Strawberry Days[,]”
which was, after all, “the longest continuing community celebration in
Utah to date.”9 When the Fraternal Order of Eagles donated a
monument of the Ten Commandments in 1971 to Pleasant Grove as part
of a broad campaign to place thousands of monuments throughout the
country, the city readily displayed the monument in a public park,
Pioneer Park.10 Decades later, however, when a little-known religious
organization calling itself the Summum asked to display a monument of
its own religious precepts (called the “Seven Aphorisms”) alongside the
Ten Commandments, the City of Pleasant Grove politely declined.11 But
this time, the minor inconvenience will not be resolved as easily or
economically as a name change or the decision to continue a summer
strawberry festival in spite of the dearth of local strawberry farms. The
3
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
4
The Architect of the Capitol, Quotations and Inscriptions in the Capitol Complex,
http://www.aoc.gov/cc/cc_quotations.cfm. (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) (quoting Rufus
Choate).
5
Id. (quoting Psalm 16:1).
6
Pleasant Grove: Utah’s City of Trees, http://www.plgrove.org (last visited Oct. 17,
2008).
7
Id. (follow “Business & Development” hyperlink; then follow “Economic Profile”
hyperlink).
8
Id. (follow “Unique to Pleasant Grove” hyperlink; then follow “Pleasant Grove
History” hyperlink).
9
Id.
10
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 (Feb. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
11
Id. at 5.
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Summum filed suit in a federal district court in 2005, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief, claiming that a city that accepts one group’s
religious message for public display must equally accept another group’s
religious message.12
The District Court ruled in favor of Pleasant Grove.13 That decision
was later overruled by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held
that the City’s placement policies were subject to strict scrutiny because
Pioneer Park is a traditional public forum.14 The Summum prevailed
again by a razor-sharp (6-6) margin upon a motion for rehearing en banc,
prompting unusual dissents and opinions from the Justices.15 The
Summum’s success has caused conservatives endless hand-wringing at
the prospect of our nation’s public parks facing the Hobbesian choice of
either removing existing privately donated monuments or allowing all
privately donated monuments to be displayed. Conservative legal
foundations have gleefully assumed the fight,16 sensing an opportunity
to make headway in their frustrated battle to reintroduce displays of
piety into public governmental life. Casting their bait, the foundations
chummed the waters by dangling the horrific prospect of a Statue of
Tyranny being erected next to the Statue of Liberty and the Alice in
Wonderland statue in Central Park being dismantled.17 The United
States Supreme Court, newly constituted after the longest period in its
history (since 182318) without a change in membership,19 faithfully bit,
and granted certiorari20 in spite of the fact that the Summum litigation
had not progressed beyond denial of the preliminary injunction request
in the United States District Court for Utah.21
In this Article, we examine the issues that bring First Amendment
jurisprudence to this fascinating and troubling case. For the most part,
our examination proceeds chronologically. Part II of this Article

Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), aff’d en banc, 499 F.3d
1170 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008).
13
Id. at 1048.
14
Summum, 499 F.3d at 1174.
15
Id. at 1170.
16
See generally Jon Meacham, Golly, Madison, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 2008, at 63 (quoting
STEVEN WALDMAN, FOUNDING FAITH (2008)). This is ironic, as “‘separation of church and
state would not exist if not for the efforts of eighteenth-century evangelicals.’” Id.
17
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 13, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665
(Nov. 20 2008).
18
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr/
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
19
Linda Greenhouse, Under the Microscope Longer Than Most, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at
43.
20
Summum, 128 S. Ct. at 1737.
21
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 10, at 17.
12
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examines the historical basis of America’s “religious heritage.” We
examine the role of the Western frontier as a safety valve for freethinkers and others from governmental intervention in religion, and the
ongoing tension between the Adams and Jefferson views on how pious
government should be. In Part III, we explore historic judicial treatment
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment and the twenty-five year
degradation of the wall of separation between church and state,
including the successful efforts by religious conservatives to cast the
debate in terms of the Free Speech clause rather than the Establishment
or Free Exercise Clauses. We also trace the short-lived and curious life of
the “expressive association” doctrine in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence as a possible predictor of the limits of the Free Speech
argument Summum advances. In Part IV, we examine the Ten
Commandments and the inherent discrimination present in modern-day
attempts to advance a particular version of the Ten Commandments as
secular. We also examine the Court’s twin 2005 decisions on the public
display of the Ten Commandments, and we look at the manner in which
Van Orden v. Perry paved the road for Summum. In Part V, we lay out the
facts of the Summum litigation and examine the questions both raised
and begged by the Summum case. Finally, in Part VI, by drawing upon
Rousseau’s civic religion, we suggest alternative routes for the Court to
pursue in similar cases in the future, including a resolution of the vexing
questions posed by the Summum and the monument in Pleasant Grove.
We argue that in light of America’s increasing religious diversity22 and
our rising religious intolerance,23 the Supreme Court should set aside
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (120th ed. 2000).
In 1980, Protestant was the religious preference of 61% of Americans; 28% were Catholic;
2% were Jewish; 2% reported themselves as other; and 7% had no religious preference. Id.
In 1999, those numbers had shifted to 55% Protestant; 28% Catholic (back up from 25% in
1990); 2% Jewish; 6% other; and 8% had no religious preference. Id. Only 43% of
Americans were weekly church/synagogue attendees. Id. In twenty years, those
Americans who described themselves as “[o]ther” or having no religious preference
jumped from 9% to 16%, an increase of 55.5 percent. Id. Since 1991, the annual net
immigration rate in the United States has been running between 3.1% and 3.9%. Id. at 8.
23
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, F.B.I., HATE CRIME STATISTICS (2005). In 2005, law
enforcement agencies reported that 15.7% of reported hate crimes were motivated by
religious bias. Id. Of those, 68.5% were anti-Jewish; 11.1% were anti-Islamic; 7.8% were
anti-other (unspecified) religions; 4.6% were anti-Catholic; 4.4% were anti-Protestant; 3.2%
were anti-multiple religions; and 0.4% were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism. Id. The U.S.
Census lumped Muslims in with “[o]ther”—Buddhist, Hindu, etc. See U.S. CENSUS, supra
note 23, at 62. Yet, the percentage of anti-Islamic hate crimes exceeded the total percentage
of other in the 2000 Census. Id. A reporter for the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights issued a report in 1998 that found religious intolerance in the United
States and specifically “an islamophobia reflecting both racial and religious intolerance.”
ABDELFATTAH AMOR, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1
22
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conservative ideology in order to better serve the long-term interests of
an increasingly diverse American polity.
II. AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS HERITAGE
Before the ink on the First Amendment was dry, the country began
its earnest debate about the meaning of religion in public life. The
debate has taken on a new urgency in modern times, with conservatives
claiming the country was founded as a Christian nation,24 and liberals
arguing otherwise.25 In this Section, we trace this debate as it played out
between founding fathers Thomas Jefferson and John Adams and its
effect on the expanding Western frontier. We narrow the discussion by
concentrating on how the debate has affected the controversy
surrounding Ten Commandment displays around the country.
A. Jefferson’s Wall of Separation v. Adams’s Public Piety
Two prominent founding fathers had very different ideas about how
to reconcile the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment.26 Thomas Jefferson’s thoughts can be traced to his 1779 Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom.27 His views on church-state
relations were influenced by his own personal views—although he
believed in Jesus and called himself a Christian, he believed that “powerhungry monarchs and corrupt ‘priests’ had despoiled the original,
pristine teachings of Jesus.”28 Jefferson thought that true religious
freedom required both free exercise and the disestablishment of religion
by the state.29 “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” Jefferson
wrote, and consequently,

(1998) http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/3129ccf9f586f716802
56739003494e4?Opendocument. We note that these figures are before the anti-Muslim
feelings spiked in the U.S. after the events of September 11, 2001.
24
See, e.g., MICHAEL NOVAK, ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2002).
25
See, e.g., CHRIS RODDA, LIARS FOR JESUS: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S ALTERNATIVE VERSION
OF AMERICAN HISTORY (2006).
26
See generally John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion, 32 CAP. U.
L. REV. 499 (2004) [hereinafter Freedom of Public Religion]; John Witte, Jr., Publick Religion:
Adams v. Jefferson, FIRST THINGS: A MONTHLY J. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, 29–34 (Mar. 2004)
[hereinafter Publick Religion]; John Witte, Jr., ‘A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of
Religion’: John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213 (1999)
[hereinafter John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment].
27
Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 501–04.
28
DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 82 (2006).
29
Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 501.
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no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor
shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in
his body or goods, or shall otherwise suffer, on account
of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall
be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in
no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities.30
During his presidency, Thomas Jefferson coined the term “wall of
separation” in his famous letter of January 1, 1802 to the Danbury
Baptists.31 Jefferson’s viewpoint seems to take the broader reading of the
First Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion”—a reading that includes in its
ambit a prohibition against recognizing the mere existence of religion as
opposed to a narrower reading that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of a religion, which would seem to provide
no such protection.32 Indeed, Jefferson explicitly endorsed the notion
that religion is a strictly private matter “which lies solely between man
and his God, and that man owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship.”33
John Adams, the second president and Jefferson’s chief political
rival, presented an international treaty to the country that included the
famous words, “‘[T]he government of the United States of America is
not, in any sense, founded on the Christian Religion . . . [.]’”34 A Puritan
at heart, he did not even visit his first Catholic church until the
Continental Congress, when he, George Washington and others visited
St. Mary’s Church in Philadelphia.35 “Both repelled and moved,” he

Id. (citing A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON:
CONTAINING HIS MAJOR WRITINGS, PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED, EXCEPT HIS LETTERS 946,
947 (Saul K. Padover ed. 1943)).
31
Letter to Danbury Baptists, supra note 2.
32
U.S. CONST. amend. I. For further discussion of this distinction, see George L.
Alexander, Separation of Church and State, http://www.friendsjournal.org/separationchurch-and-state (last visited Oct, 17, 2008).
33
Letter to Danbury Baptists, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
34
See Ed Buckner, Does the 1796–97 Treaty with Tripoli Matter to Church/State Separation?,
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/buckner_tripoli.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
The language of the treaty was meant to persuade Tripoli (now Libya) that the United
States would not engage in a religious war with Muslims. Id. The treaty language was
ratified by the Senate and there is no record of a public outcry in any major city or city
newspaper. Id.
35
Holmes, supra note 28, at 2.
30
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later described the service as “‘aw[e]ful and affecting.’”36 In contrast to
Jefferson, however, Adams did not support the idea of a wall of
separation (if one stream of modern scholarship is correct).37
Professor John Witte, Jr.38 wrote the following summary of Adams’s
views:
The notion that a state could remain neutral and purged
of any public religion was, for Adams, equally a
philosophical fiction. Absent a commonly adopted set
of values and beliefs, politicians would invariably hold
out their private convictions as public ones. It was thus
essential for each community to define and defend the
basics of a public religion. In Adams’s view, its creed
was honesty, diligence, devotion, obedience, virtue, and
love of God, neighbor, and self. Its icons were the Bible,
the bells of liberty, the memorials of patriots, and the
Constitution. Its clergy were public-spirited ministers
and religiously committed politicians. Its liturgy was
the public proclamation of oaths, prayers, songs, and
election and Thanksgiving Day sermons. Its policy was
state appointment of chaplains for the legislature, the
military, and prisons; state sanctions against blasphemy,
sacrilege, and iconoclasm; state administration of tithe
collections, test oaths, and clerical appointments; and
state sponsorship of religious societies, schools, and
charities. “Statesmen may plan and speculate for
liberty,” Adams wrote in defense of his views, “but it is
religion and morality alone which can establish the
principles upon which freedom can securely stand.” A
“Publick Religion” sets the “foundation[s], not only of
republicanism and of all free government, but of social
felicity under all governments and in all the
combinations of human society.”39

Id. at 3.
See generally Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26; Publick Religion, supra note 26;
John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, supra note 26.
38
Witte is the Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Director of Law and Religion Program,
and Director of Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion at Emory University,
Atlanta, Georgia.
39
Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 504 (citing THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
(Charles Francis Adams, ed.1850–56) (footnote omitted)).
36
37

602

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Witte posited these two models of religious liberty, justifying his
emphasis on the two by citing the prominence of their proponents and
the importance of their respective states, Virginia and Massachusetts.40
However, Professor Witte judiciously noted the common ground and
beliefs shared by Jefferson and Adams: both men were consciously
engaged in a new experiment in religious liberty; both started with the
credo of the American Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson
drafted41 and Adams signed;42 and both insisted on providing
constitutional protection for every peaceable, private religious belief and
the holder thereof in their era.43
However, the contrasts are as significant as the shared ground:
whereas Jefferson proposed a robust freedom of expression, Adams
approved only a moderate or “‘tempered’” religious freedom; whereas
Jefferson pushed for a complete separation of church and state, Adams
wanted only a division of religious and political offices; and whereas
Jefferson sought the complete disestablishment of all religions, Adams
campaigned for a modest, “‘mild’” establishment of one public religion
as a balance or check on individual religious freedom.44
Based upon an impressive array of information and scholarship,
Professor Witte declared that “[f]or the first century and a half of the
republic, it was Adams’s style of argument about religious
liberty . . . that dominated the nation . . . .”45 By the time of America’s
fourth President, Madison, the culture of religious freedom had firmly
taken root. Madison would go on to become “a kind of Adam Smith of
church and state: he believed that the marketplace, if left to its own
devices without government interference, would produce stronger
religious belief, not weaker.”46 He argued “that only liberty of
conscience could guarantee civil and political liberty.”47 In an interesting
antecedent to today’s debate, Madison’s “belief that citizens should
voluntarily support religion led him to oppose the appointment of
Id. at 505.
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. WINES, ETHICS, LAW, AND BUSINESS 28–29 (2006). Jefferson wrote
the bulk of the document by himself for a committee composed of John Adams, Benjamin
Franklin, Jefferson, Robert R. Livingston, and Roger Sherman. Id. Only Franklin and
Adams made minor changes to Jefferson’s draft, which he worked on and completed in
two weeks. Id. at 29. See also Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 505. Professor
Witte, in a minor oversight, wrote that “they [Adams and Jefferson] drafted[]” the
Declaration of Independence. Id.
42
Wines, supra note 41, at 378.
43
Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 505.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 505, 506–10.
46
Meacham, supra note 16, at 63.
47
Holmes, supra note 28, at 93.
40
41
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chaplains for Congress and for the army and navy.”48 In arguing against
assessments for funding religion, Madison observed:
Who does not see that the same authority which can
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions,
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? that [sic] the
same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any
one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?49
It turns out that “[Madison] was right: once the federal government
declined to establish a church and the states moved to disestablish
(Massachusetts was the last, in 1833), religious belief grew.”50
B. After 150 Years, a Wall of Separation Goes Up in Public Places
Horace Greeley is attributed with the famous aphorism: “‘Go West,
young man, and grow up with the country.’”51 Until the end of the
nineteenth century, states were free to use assimilation and
accommodation to clamp down on dissenters,52 who responded by using
the “escape . . . valve” of moving west.53 “The right and duty to emigrate
was a basic assumption of the early American experiment in religious
liberty[]”54—at least, John Adams’s style. Frederick Jackson Turner, the
historian, famously observed in 1893 that the American frontier had

Id. at 94.
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS BY JAMES MADISON,
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) (follow “Founding Era”
hyperlink; then follow “James Madison” hyperlink; then follow “Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” hyperlink).
50
Meacham, supra note 16, at 63.
51
David H. Fenimore, Horace Greeley, (1996), http://wolfweb.unr.edu/homepage/
fenimore/greeley.html.
52
Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 506–09.
53
Id. at 508. Professor Witte observed:
One of the saving assumptions of this system was the presence of
the frontier, and the right to emigrate thereto. Religious minorities
who could not abide by a community’s religious restrictions or accept
its religious patronage were not expected to stay long . . . They
moved—sometimes at gunpoint—to establish their own communities
on the frontier[.]
Id.
54
Id.
48
49
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disappeared.55 Curiously, Jackson, a University of Wisconsin Professor,
was right in the sense that there no longer was a sharp demarcation on
the U.S. Census map indicating a “frontier” in terms of population
density per square mile;56 however, in a larger sense, the American
frontier had not closed.57 For our purposes, the “frontier”—in the sense
of an open and virtually unsettled wilderness where one could go to
escape forced participation in a community with an established public
religion—was on the verge of disappearing; but 1893 has no talismanic
significance.58
As a consequence of the closing of the traditional geographic safety
valve for free thinkers, heretics, and iconoclasts, the Supreme Court
needed to intervene to protect the Free Speech and religious freedoms of
minorities, particularly unpopular minorities. The seeds for such a
process can be found in the Holmes dissent (from the Espionage Act
convictions of the petitioners in the Abrams case), which resulted in the
“clear and imminent danger” standard for free speech.59 As late as 1940,
the Supreme Court upheld requirements that public school children
salute the flag.60 Undeterred, Jehovah’s Witnesses brought another case
to the Court just three years later. In that case, the Court reversed its
course and by a 6-3 margin expressly overruled its 1940 decision,
reasoning that the First Amendment protects individuals from state
compulsion to salute the flag.61 As we discuss below, however, the role
of the Court in protecting unpopular religious minorities has sharply
reversed since the 1940s.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
In spite of the desire to escape religious tyranny, America’s early
history demonstrates a fair amount of religious intolerance. Nine
colonies had official religions,62 and in some, such as Maryland, denying
the existence of Jesus Christ was punishable by death.63 In other
See FMC Program Segments 1990–1930: Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis,
http://www.pbs.org/fmc/ segments/ progseg1.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
56
Id.
57
See, e.g., PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST
OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1987).
58
See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 451 (2007). In 1893, for example, there were
only 44 stars on the U.S. flag. Wyoming had become the 44th state in 1890. Id. New
Mexico and Arizona became the 47th and 48th states, respectively, in 1912. Id.
59
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919).
60
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
61
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
62
Holmes, supra note 28, at 34.
63
Alexander, supra note 32, at 8.
55
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colonies, only professed Christians could run for public office.64 The
Declaration of Independence is replete with references to God, a
necessity “to mobilize the citizenry in a time of war.”65 In the
Constitution itself, however, there is not a single mention of God; but
there is a prohibition on any religious test as a qualification for office
under the United States66 and, after 1791, the First Amendment provided
for the free exercise of religion and required the separation of church and
state.67 Containing the avant-garde ideas of Roger Williams and his
followers, the Rhode Island Charter of 1663 was the first broad
declaration of religious freedom in the colonial settlements.68 From
Charles II, the Rhode Island and Providence plantations solicited and
received the guarantee that “everye person may . . . freelye and fullye
have and enjoye his . . . owne judgments and consciences, in matters of
religious concernments[.]”69 Williams might have considered the charter
provision an opening wedge for other rights. At any rate, he did not
limit his vision to religious freedom, but rather expounded the radical
doctrine calling for broad liberties that would permit the widest latitude
for personal freedom.
In a similar vein, the “fundamental laws of West New Jersey” were
granted in 1676 “by the proprietors on the specific condition that they
were ‘to be the foundation of the government . . . not to be altered by the
Legislative authority’ under any circumstances.”70 In these laws, the
West New Jersey proprietors agreed to a provision assuring broad
religious freedom.71 No freeholder, or inhabitant of the province, could
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.72
Two colonial charters issued in the 1680s followed the West New
Jersey pattern.73 The New Hampshire Charter of 1680, though not
mentioning other personal rights, did grant liberty of conscience to all
Protestants.74
Pennsylvania was the scene of a more forthright
Id.
Id.
66
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
67
U.S. CONST. amend I.
68
ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776–1791 17 (1955).
69
Id. at 17 (quoting BENJAMIN P. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1596–97 (1878)).
70
Id. at 18–19 (quoting FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2548–51 (1909)).
71
Id. at 19.
72
Id. (quoting FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2548–51 (1909)).
73
Id. at 20.
74
Id. (quoting BENJAMIN P. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1277 (1878)).
64
65
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experiment in freedom, for there William Penn, a former West New
Jersey proprietor, applied the ideas that had worked so well in New
Jersey.75 Also “termed a ‘charter of liberties,’” the Pennsylvania Frame of
Government of 1683 granted extensive personal rights.76 Freemen were
authorized to elect a General Assembly to make laws and were
permitted to plead their own cases in court before a jury of twelve men.77
By 1770, Pennsylvania would be filled with many small religious groups,
many from Germany, all believing “that they had restored practices of
apostolic Christianity that mainstream Christianity had wrongly
abandoned[.]”78 It should be noted, however, that religious toleration in
Pennsylvania was limited to those “who confess[ed] and
acknowledge[d] the one Almighty and eternal God, to be the Creator,
Upholder, and Ruler of the world.”79 Despite its restrictive character,
this and similar religious provisions of other charters represented a
notable break from the narrow conception of tolerance prevailing
throughout most of Europe.80
A “‘Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges[,]’” passed by the New
York General Assembly in 1683, guaranteed substantive personal rights
to freeholders.81 The charter assured accused persons the right to a trial
by a jury of peers with “‘reasonable [c]hallenges.’”82 Bail was allowed in
all cases except those involving treason or felony.83 The quartering of
troops in private dwellings during peacetime was forbidden.84 Another
provision forbade trial and punishment of civilians under martial law.85
Free exercise of faith was guaranteed to Christians as long as they did
not disturb the peace.86
The Duke of York, now turned king, refused to approve this
legislation.87 Undaunted, New York citizens continued to press for the
personal protection already enjoyed by other colonies.88 Then in 1691,
the provincial Legislative Council approved a second declaration of
rights which included liberty of conscience for all (except for professed
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id.
Holmes, supra note 28, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Rutland, supra note 68, at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Roman Catholics) and repeated the personal rights guarantees of the
enactment of 1683.89 With James II removed by the revolution, this bill,
although it lacked permanency, appears to have become law.90
When a young America adopted the Bill of Rights in 1791, the First
Amendment prohibited the establishment of state-sponsored religion.
At the time, it was only intended “‘to apply to the federal government,
not the local governments that regulate schools, local courthouses and
town squares.’”91 (We note as an aside that the originalist jurisprudence
adopted by Justices Scalia,92 Thomas,93 and Alito,94 if adopted, would not
stop cities or states from establishing government-sponsored religion.)
In 1947, however, a different United States Supreme Court incorporated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment, thereby applying its prohibitions to state governments as
well as the federal government.95 It is also significant that the Court’s
1947 decision laid the foundation for modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence by reviewing the history of the clause and adopting
Thomas Jefferson’s and James Madison’s “wall of separation”
language.96
The Supreme Court’s endorsement of a wall of separation picked up
momentum, and seemed to peak in the 1960s under the Warren Court.
In 1963, for example, the Court invalidated South Carolina’s application
of its Unemployment Compensation Act because the Act authorized the
denial of benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for refusing
to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath.97 In 1965, the Court broadly

Id. (quoting THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 113 (1894–96)).
Id.
91
Meacham, supra note 16, at 63 (quoting STEVEN WALDMAN, FOUNDING FAITH (2008)).
92
Justice Scalia has said that he believes “‘[Y]ou give the text the meaning it had when it
was adopted.’” Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/
current/guest_commentary/scalia-constitutional-speech.html.
93
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), should be overturned because the
First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect speech in public schools).
94
See Jeffrey Rosen, Alito vs. Roberts, Word by Word, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at D1
(noting Justice Samuel Alito’s remark that “‘[t]he principles don’t change. The Constitution
itself doesn’t change. But the factual situations change.’”).
95
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
96
Id. at 18 (writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black declared: “The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable.”). For a history of the evolution of Establishment Clause doctrine and for
criticisms of the Everson case, see Adam M. Conrad, Hanging the Ten Commandments on the
Wall Separating Church and State: Toward a New Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 38 GA. L.
REV. 1329, 1337–41 (2004).
97
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
89
90
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construed the “belief” required to qualify for the status of a
conscientious objector to encompass any sincere and meaningful belief in
“a Supreme Being” that would occupy a parallel place in the life of the
possessor as that of the orthodox belief in God.98 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Douglas agreed with the majority’s interpretation and
stressed that any interpretation that embraced one religious faith and not
another would violate the Free Exercise Clause.99 He further argued that
such an interpretation would “result in a denial of equal protection by
preferring some religions to others—an invidious discrimination that
would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”100
In 1968, the Warren Court went so far as to carve out an exception to the
longstanding rule that taxpayers lack standing to challenge the use of
taxpayer funds if the challenger alleges a violation of the Establishment
Clause.101
This jurisprudence has been under attack in recent years,102 and
lower courts appear to have responded in kind. Decisions addressing
faith-based initiatives and school voucher programs provide the clearest
examples of the recent deterioration of the wall of separation between
church and state. In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court in
2002 reversed a Sixth Circuit decision103 and upheld a voucher system
that favored the placement of students in sectarian schools put in place
by the State of Ohio.104 Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the state’s amended Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program, which allows students to attend, at no charge, private sectarian
and nonsectarian schools.105
The so-called “[f]aith-[b]ased [i]nitiatives[]”106 spearheaded by
President George W. Bush spawned numerous federal and state cases.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
Id. at 188–89 (Douglas, J., concurring).
100
Id. at 188.
101
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
102
See generally Terence Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for Reform, (forthcoming in NEV.
L.J.). Judicial interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, in keeping with
the constitutional scheme for courts and Marbury, have raised the ire of conservatives. Id.
This anger has translated into endorsement by so-called men of faith for acts of violence
against judges and multiple legislative attempts to remove these cases from the jurisdiction
of the courts. Id.
103
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
104
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
105
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
106
See, e.g., Carol J. De Vita & Sarah Wilson, Faith-Based Initiatives: Sacred Deeds and
Secular Dollars, (July 1, 2001) http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310351&renderfor
print=1. We do not comment on the effectiveness of the faith-based initiatives beyond
referring to the studies done on them by the Urban Institute, a non-partisan, non-profit
think tank established to study the effectiveness of government programs. Id. One
98
99
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For example, on January 25, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia held that Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) was constitutional on the ground
that it was a proper exercise of Congress’s spending power.107 On
January 7, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin upheld a grant of funds by the Department of Corrections to
Faith Works, Milwaukee, Inc., a faith-based, long-term alcohol and drug
treatment program, but struck down a similar grant from the
Department of Workforce Development.108
The highest-profile challenge to the faith-based initiatives, however,
resulted in a procedural attack on standing rather than a substantive
challenge based on the Establishment Clause. Relying on the Flast
exception that permits taxpayer standing in cases challenging the
unconstitutional use of taxpayer funds in violation of the Establishment
Clause,109 the Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) challenged
President Bush’s White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives.110 Created by Executive Order,111 the Office of Faith Based
and Community Initiatives provided financial support to, among other
groups, MentorKids USA, an organization with a stated mission “‘[t]o
exalt the Lord Jesus Christ as the Son of God, the Savior of the World[,]”
hired only Christians as mentors, and required mentors to provide
monthly reports to assess whether their mentee was progressing in their
relationship with God.112 During oral argument, the Solicitor General
Paul Clement sought to distinguish Flast by arguing that taxpayer
standing is only appropriate when Congress, pursuant to its taxing and
spending power, passes a statute that enables money to be disbursed
outside of the government in violation of the Establishment Clause.113
problem that an early Urban Institute study highlighted, beyond that of funneling taxpayer
dollars to organizations that are exempt from the fair hiring requirements of Title VII of the
1965 Civil Rights Act, was that inner city, poor churches lack the staff and financial
resources to prepare the grant requests necessary to participate in faith-based initiatives
with the unfortunate result in the D.C. area that much of the money went to suburban
mega-churches whose programs did not reach the very poor and needy in the central city.
Id.
107
Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645 (2006), remanded to 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. Va.
2006).
108
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis.
2002).
109
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
110
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Dennis Grace v. Freedom From Religion Found.,
Inc., No. 06-157 (Sept. 9, 2004).
111
Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002).
112
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 44a–45a.
113
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-157).
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An incredulous Justice Breyer asked if standing would exist where
“Congress passes a statute and says in every city, town, and hamlet, we
are going to have a minister, a Government minister, a Government
church . . . dedicated to the proposition that this particular sect is the true
sect[.]”114 General Clement replied that even in that case, there would
not be taxpayer standing under Flast.115
In a 5-4 decision, with a plurality opinion by Justice Alito joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, the Court accepted General
Clement’s arguments, holding that because the White House Office of
Faith-Based Initiatives was established by an action of the executive
branch pursuant to “general Executive Branch appropriations[,]” FFRF
lacked standing.116 The plurality’s refusal to overrule Flast117 led to a
separate concurrence, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice
Thomas, complaining: “We had an opportunity today to erase this blot
on our jurisprudence, but instead have simply smudged it.”118 Thus, it
would appear, Justice Stewart’s contention that “‘every taxpayer can
claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a
religious institution[]’” no longer rings true in 2008.119
The modern Supreme Court’s erosion of the wall of separation took
an interesting turn in 2000 when, in a 5-4 decision, it held that Boy Scouts
of America (“BSA”) had a First Amendment right to exclude gay
scoutmasters.120 The case involved the termination of an openly gay man
as an assistant troop leader solely on the basis of his sexual orientation.121
The scout leader had prevailed at every step of the litigation up through
the New Jersey Supreme Court, arguing that under New Jersey Human
Rights Law,122 BSA engaged in illegal discrimination.123 Brushing aside
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, a majority of
the United States Supreme Court held that the right to associate under
the First Amendment must also include the right not to associate.124 In
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that
requiring BSA to retain the scoutmaster would significantly burden the
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
116
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007).
117
Id. at 2571–72 (“We do not extend Flast, but we also do not overrule it. We leave Flast
as we found it.” (plurality opinion)).
118
Id. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119
Id. at 2585 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968)
(Stewart, J. concurring)).
120
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
121
Id. at 645.
122
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10: 5–4 (2000).
123
Dale, 530 U.S. at 646.
124
Id.
114
115
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organization’s right to teach boys “‘that homosexual conduct is not
morally straight[.]’”125
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
observed that, because BSA did not endorse any position on sexual
matters, requiring BSA to retain the scoutmaster (1) did not impose any
serious burden on BSA’s shared goals; (2) did not compel BSA to endorse
a particular message; and (3) abridged no right of BSA under the
Constitution.126 Moreover, Justice Stevens pointed out that BSA claimed
to be non-sectarian.127 Indeed, many diverse religious organizations
sponsor local Boy Scout Troops, and “[b]ecause a number of religious
groups do not view homosexuality as immoral or wrong and reject
discrimination against homosexuals, it is exceedingly difficult to believe
that [BSA] nonetheless adopts a single particular religious or moral
philosophy when it comes to sexual orientation.”128
The result in this case is that by the slimmest margin, the Court
permitted BSA to endorse a religious message of some of its sponsoring
organizations over the conflicting message of other sponsoring
organizations and justified it all by relying on the First Amendment.
This sleight of hand provides a prelude to the majority decision in Van
Orden v. Perry,129 which also involved the promotion of one group’s
religious interpretations over equally valid but different interpretations.
In a case described as a “predictable fallout from the Boy Scouts’
victory before the [United States] Supreme Court[,]” the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California invalidated the City
of San Diego’s long-term lease of prized public parklands to the Boy
Scouts on the grounds that such a lease violated the Establishment
Clause of the Federal Constitution and the No Aid and No Preferences
Clauses of the California Constitution.130 The case remains on appeal
before the Ninth Circuit, which in turn has asked the California Supreme
Court to clarify the meaning of the relevant portions of the California
Constitution.131
IV. RELIGIOUS PUBLIC DISPLAYS AND THE CONSTITUTION
The debate over, and resulting experiment in, religious freedom, that
has made “‘[t]he United States . . . among the most religious and most
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 651.
Id. at 669 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 670–71 (footnote omitted).
See infra Part IV.C.
Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of Am., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
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tolerant of nations,’”132 is in sharp focus in the Summum case. Religious
conservatives, angry and hurt over a perceived deviation from the
originalist meaning of the Establishment Clause, have fought for years to
re-introduce piety into public life. In the 1950s, at the height of the
country’s fear of the spread of atheism attendant with Communist rule,
President Eisenhower began a new Washington tradition of prayer
breakfasts.133 Congress responded by establishing a prayer room in the
Capitol.134 In 1954, the words “‘under God’” were added to the Pledge
of Allegiance.135 In 1955, Congress added the words “‘In God We Trust’”
on all paper money.136 In 1956, Congress replaced “‘E Pluribus Unum’”
with “‘In God We Trust’” as the country’s national motto.137 Despite the
fall of Communism in the 1980s, the fight over public displays of piety
continues to this day at both the state level (witness Ohio’s 2006 statute
requiring school districts to display any donation of a plaque with either
“‘In God We Trust’” or “‘With God, All Things Are Possible’” in a
classroom, auditorium, or cafeteria)138 and federal level (such as efforts
in the House of Representatives to recognize the importance of
Christmas and the Christian faith)139.
Discontent with the lack of public displays of piety, evangelical
Christians have forced the issue of the government’s endorsement of
religion squarely back into the public eye. In recent years, we have
witnessed attempts by school boards to outlaw the teaching of evolution
in public schools,140 the introduction of a creationist-based philosophy
called “Intelligent Design” into school-science curricula,141 public
displays of piety on vehicle license plates such as South Carolina’s “‘I
Believe’” license plates,142 righteous indignation every December at the
“War on Christmas,”143 public harangues of atheists,144 and even the

Meacham, supra note 16, at 63 (emphasis omitted).
David Greenberg, The Pledge of Allegiance: Why We’re Not One Nation Under God, (2002)
http://www.slate.com/?id=2067499.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.801 (West 2006).
139
Recognizing the Importance of Christmas and the Christian Faith, H.R. Res. 847, 110th
Cong. (2007).
140
See Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga., 2005), vacated
and remanded, 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
141
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
142
Sean Hamill, South Carolina to Offer Cross on Car Plates, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at
A14.
143
See, e.g., Airport Christmas Trees Make Comeback, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2006/12/12/national/main2249724.shtml.
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mass relocation of evangelicals to South Carolina in hopes of seceding
from the United States and creating a new Biblical republic.145 The First
Amendment paradox appears as alive today as it has ever been in our
nation’s history, as the prohibition against government validation of
religiosity squares off against an intolerant strain of the Christian
majority that raises conversion to the level of a fundamental tenet, a
pillar of the faith.
The main act in this drama, however, remains the Ten
Commandments.
Woefully misunderstood and often framed
erroneously, it remains the flashpoint between those who seek the
aggrandizement of religious public displays and those who oppose such
expansion. The battle over the Ten Commandments has cost at least one
Alabama State Supreme Court justice his job,146 and the proper role for
the Ten Commandments in public life continues to give impetus for
much legislative action.147 In this Section, we examine the Ten
Commandments in some detail, and conclude that they are inherently
religious precepts, in spite of efforts to cast them as nonsectarian. Armed
with that conclusion, we examine the Supreme Court’s Ten
Commandments jurisprudence, and argue that unless the Court
overturns its 2005 Perry decision, the outcome in Summum will almost
certainly result in the city prevailing and a startling rise in governmentendorsed public displays of piety.

See generally Eric Zorn, Representative Tries to Put Fear of God in Atheist, CHI. TRIB.,
April 8,
2008,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-change_atheist_bd06
apr06,0,1260452.story.
In April 2008, Illinois state representative Monique Davis
interrupted testimony by atheist activist Rob Sherman before the House State Government
Administration Committee in Springfield by telling him:
“What you have to spew and spread is extremely dangerous . . . it’s
dangerous for our children to even know that your philosophy exists!
“This is the Land of Lincoln where people believe in God[]” . . . . “Get
out of that seat . . . You have no right to be here! We believe in
something. You believe in destroying! You believe in destroying what
this state was built upon.”
Id.
145
Ron Barnett, Christian Movement Moving In, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2006, at 3A.
146
Ten Commandments Judge Removed From Office, (Nov. 14, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/
2003/LAW/11/13/moore.tencommandments/.
147
See, e.g., S. Res. 483, 110th Cong. (2008) (recognizing the first weekend of May 2008 as
Ten Commandments Weekend); H.R. Res. 12, 110th Cong. (2007) (requiring the display of
the Ten Commandments in the United States Capitol). See also Diana Henriques, In the
Congressional Hopper: A Long Wish List of Special Benefits and Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2006, at A20 (listing pending federal legislation concerning religious freedom); Diana
Henriques, Religion-Based Tax Breaks: Housing to Paychecks to Books, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2006, at A1 (reporting preferential tax treatment for clergy members and their religious
employers).
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A. The Ten Commandments
In 1956, Cecil B. DeMille was searching for a way to promote his
Paramount Pictures production, The Ten Commandments.148 The nearly
four-hour movie, featuring the parting of the Red Sea in technicolor, was
“by far the largest and most expensive” DeMille production.149 In an
“ingenious” public relations campaign, he established a partnership with
the Fraternal Order of Eagles (“FOE”), commissioned the construction of
several thousand Ten Commandments monuments, and donated them
around the country.150 The FOE was no stranger to this form of
donation, making national news in 1952 for donating an “illuminated
print” of the Ten Commandments to President Truman (himself an
Eagle), who commented that the U.S. “[g]overnment was patterned to
some extent on the laws given to Moses on Mount Sinai.”151 The
donations took place during gala events attended by the movie’s stars—
Yul Brynner attended the Milwaukee party, and Charlton Heston
attended a party in North Dakota.152 The public displays prompted one
New Yorker, a stenographer at the New York Life Insurance Company
living at home with her mother, to pay for subway car advertisements to
publicize the Ten Commandments from her life savings, earning her the
International Civic Award from the FOE.153 When the Order presented
Rev. Billy Graham with a civic service award in 1957, he “praised the
[O]rder for its program of placing framed copies of the Ten
Commandments in schools and public buildings.”154
Ironically, while the FOE was interested in using the Ten
Commandments to spread morality and virtue, DeMille was more
interested in selling sex on the silver screen. He wrote:
“I am sometimes accused[] . . . of gingering up the Bible
with large and lavish infusions of sex and violence. I
can only wonder if my accusers have ever read certain
parts of the Bible. If they have, they must have read
them through that stained-glass telescope which
Frank Rich, The God Racket, From DeMille to DeLay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at B1.
Bosley Crowther, Screen: The Ten Commandments; DeMille’s Production Opens at
Criterion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1956, at 35.
150
Rich, supra note 148.
151
Truman Gets Decalogue Print, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1952, at 16.
152
Rich, supra note 148.
153
Commandments Ad Honored by Eagles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1956, at F19.
154
Wagner Praises Order of Eagles, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1957, at 17. The Order was not just
involved in promoting the Ten Commandments. Id. The Order also supported and
lobbied for laws such as Social Security benefits, pensions, worker compensation, and age
discrimination. Id.
148
149
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centuries of tradition and form have put between us and
the men and women of flesh and blood who lived and
wrote the Bible.”155
The movie was still playing in theaters five years after its release and
spawned a whole generation of Bible-based Hollywood blockbusters,
including King of Kings, Barabbas, David and Goliath, and Ben Hur.156 The
Ten Commandments movie would become the fifth highest grossing
movie in history, behind Gone With the Wind, Star Wars, The Sound of
Music, and E.T.157
President Truman may have been stretching the truth when he
compared U.S. laws to the Ten Commandments. In fact, Americans are
not bound by law to follow seven of the Ten Commandments. By its
very nature, the Ten Commandments is an aggregation of ideals rather
than law.
Close examination of the substance of the Ten
Commandments reveals that some of those ideals are in direct conflict
with modern American values.
The First Commandment, for example, reflects a central tenet of
Christianity: to bring “the world[] to adopt a single, uniform system of
belief and conduct. For some believers the commitment to spread the
‘Word’ is intrinsic to their religious practice.”158 One need read no
further to see the evident tension between the First Commandment and
the First Amendment, which proclaims the right of Americans to do
exactly what the Commandment prohibits.
The Ten Commandments have been criticized by some liberal
theologians as being grossly unfair. The Second Commandment, for
example, commands that future generations shall be held responsible for
the sins of an ancestor, a notion that we would find immoral and
unfair.159

Bosley Crowther, The Good Book Is a Great Script, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1961, at SM10.
Id.
157
All Time Box Office Adjusted for Ticket Price Inflation, http://www.boxofficemojo.
com/alltime/adjusted.htm?adjust_yr=0&p=.htm.
158
Alexander, supra note 32, at 9.
159
See Dan Bilefsky, In Feuds, Isolation Engulfs Families, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at A6.
The ancient Albanian “Kanun[]” code of blood feud, which states that “‘blood must be paid
with blood,’” is still alive in some parts of Albania today, resulting in over 1,000 children
deprived of schooling because they have been locked indoors for fear of reprisal for their
fathers’ crimes. Id.
155
156
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B. The Protestant Ten Commandments Is Inherently Religious
Examination of various religious texts further reveals the sectarian
nature of the Ten Commandments. As commentator Allan Sloan
recently wrote:
You may think that the Supreme Court ruled last
week that the state of Texas could continue to display a
Ten Commandments monolith on its capitol grounds in
Austin.
But you’d be wrong.
Look at the
monolith . . . and you’ll notice that it doesn’t contain 10
commandments. It has 11. And if you count “I am the
Lord thy God” as a commandment, which Jews do but
Christians don’t, the Supreme Court has approved a
Twelve Commandments monolith, rather than the
traditional Decalogue. . . .
. . . [T]he text is a compromise drawn up by Jewish
and Christian clergy to respect everyone’s beliefs. So
rather than bearing Ten Commandments that are the
Word of God, the monolith bears 11 or 12
commandments that are the Word of a Committee.160
This is not mere semantics nor is it hairsplitting.161 The so-called Ten
Commandments are a vital part of Judeo-Christian heritage and
culture.162 As Sloan further observed in his commentary, “it’s one thing
to be in favor of ethics and morality in public life, [but] it’s a whole
different thing to think—as I suspect most Americans do—that there is
one single Decalogue.”163 Sloan may have been too tactful or his editors
too careful not to offend. The difference is not subtle: the former is a
valid belief or political opinion; but the latter is simple ignorance.
As Sloan also points out, there are two versions of the Ten
Commandments contained in the Bible and they are different.164 The
version in Exodus, chapter 20, directs observance of the Sabbath because
Allan Sloan, The Commandment Mystery, NEWSWEEK, Jul 11, 2005, at 58.
Id. See also David C. Pollack, Note, Writing on the Wall of Separation: Understanding the
Public Posting of Religious Duties and Sectarian Versions of Sacred Texts as an Establishment
Clause Violation in Ten Commandment Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1366–78 (2004)
(providing a thorough discussion of the various versions of the Ten Commandments
amongst religious groups and remarking that the Fraternal Order of Eagles and Cecil B.
DeMille erected as many as 2000 graphite monuments during their campaign containing
“at least three distinct versions of the Commandments”).
162
Sloan, supra note 160.
163
Id.
164
Id. (citing Exodus 20:2–14 and Deuteronomy 5:6–18).
160
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after the Lord created the world He rested on the seventh day.165 In the
second version, contained in Deuteronomy, chapter 5, the Lord decrees
observance of the Sabbath because he brought the Israelites out of
bondage in Egypt.166
Moreover, observant Jews did not consistently apply the
Commandments in their dealings with Gentiles. One scholar of Jewish
theology in the last century of the Second Temple has described this area
as very complex and abstruse.167 There are, at least, three different
numbering systems for the Commandments; the Jews have one, the
Roman Catholics and Lutherans have a second; and Protestants
(generally) have a third.168 Finally, theologians cannot agree on how
these Commandments should be translated; and the differences in the
translations are not insignificant.169 As one author emphasized:
“The division of the commandments themselves is not
certain. There are altogether thirteen sentences in the
accepted Jewish versions (seventeen in the Christian) but
we cannot conclude from the text itself what comprises
the first commandment, what the second, and so forth.
For while there are thirteen mitzvot [commandments] to
be found in the text, their allocation to ten
commandments can be done in various ways. It is not
surprising, therefore, that there are different traditions in
this respect.”170
For example, the Sixth Commandment171 or the Fifth Commandment
(depending on the religious group in question)172 is translated either
“‘You shall not murder[,]’”173 “Thou shalt not kill[,]”174 “‘You shall not
kill[,]’”175 or “You shall not murder.”176 Even the religious groups that
Exodus 20:10–11.
Deuteronomy 5:12–15.
167
See E. P. SANDERS, JUDAISM: PRACTICE AND BELIEF, 63 B.C.E.—67 C.E. (1992).
168
Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1485–94 (2005).
169
Id. at 1493–99.
170
Id. at 1488 (quoting THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 534 (W. Gunther Plaut, ed.,
1981) (1962)).
171
Id. at 1489 (citing the numbering in the Jewish and Protestant versions of the Ten
Commandments).
172
Id. at 1490–91 (citing the numbering in the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Lutheran
versions of the Ten Commandments).
173
Id. at 1489 (citing the Jewish version).
174
Id. (citing the Protestant version).
175
Id. at 1490 (citing the Roman Catholic version).
176
Id. at 1491 (citing the Lutheran version).
165
166
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may agree upon the Commandments numbering (for instance, Lutherans
and Roman Catholics call this the Fifth Commandment) differ on
whether the correct translation is “‘not kill’” or “not murder.”177 The
meaning of this Commandment, of course, is also subject to manifold
interpretations, especially as it relates to wartime killing, execution of
prisoners, and abortion.178
Any claims that a display of the Ten Commandments is secular or
nonsectarian are thus demonstrably false. Even the choice of numbering
and translation on any such display is an endorsement of one religion
over another. If State Y erects a granite slab with the Hebrew version of
the so-called Ten Commandments, that action favors Judaism over
Christianity, Buddhism, and atheism or non-religion. If State Y does not
pay for the granite slab, it does not alter the result.
The controversy over public displays of the Ten Commandments,
then, boils down to this: is the First Amendment violated when a statue
of the Protestant version of the Ten Commandments (an inherently
religious text central to the belief of several major world religions),
commissioned by a partnership of a Hollywood movie studio and a civic
organization for the duplicitous purpose of promoting a movie and
promoting morality among America’s youth, is displayed to the public
in space owned by the government? In 2005, the Supreme Court
confronted this question squarely, and handed down a decision that was
inconclusive at best, and at worst, all but rolled out a red carpet
invitation to the sort of litigation presented in Summum.
C. Twin Ten Commandments Cases of 2005
Almost twenty-five years after its last decision on the Ten
Commandments,179 the Supreme Court spoke again in the cases of
McCreary County v. ACLU180 and Van Orden v. Perry,181 both decisions
issued on June 27, 2005, just one month and two days before the
Id.
See, e.g., Historical Abortion Beliefs of the Christian Church, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/abo_hist.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
179
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a Kentucky law
requiring the posting of Ten Commandments in public schools violated the First
Amendment). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens concurred in the
order reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Id. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun dissented and would have granted certiorari in order to give the
cases plenary consideration. Id. at 43. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented from
summary reversal. Id. Justice Rehnquist would have upheld the trial court relying on the
legislature’s statement of secular purpose was supported by the facts of the case. Id.
180
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
181
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
177
178
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Summum filed suit in Utah. These decisions did nothing to clarify
where the line should be drawn regarding the appropriateness of
displaying the Ten Commandments. In McCreary’s 5-4 decision, the
Court held that two Kentucky counties had to take down copies of the
Ten Commandments posted in courthouses; but in Van Orden, another 54 decision, the Court held that Texas could leave a 6-foot-high
“monolith” inscribed with the Ten Commandments on its Capitol
grounds in Austin. The difference? Ostensibly, Texas had a secular
purpose, and the two Kentucky counties did not.
In McCreary, two Kentucky counties (McCreary and Pulaski)
displayed in their respective courthouses large, gold-framed copies of an
abridged text of the King James Version of the Ten Commandments,
including a citation to the Book of Exodus.182 The placement in
McCreary County was done at the direction of the county legislative
body. In Pulaski County, the Commandments were hung in a ceremony
presided over by the county Judge-Executive, accompanied by his
church’s pastor.183 The Judge-Executive “called them ‘good rules to live
by’”; and his pastor said they were “‘a creed of ethics[.]’”184
The following is the version of the commandments posted by both
counties:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness.
Thou shalt not covet.
Exodus 20:3-17.185
When we turn to Exodus 20:3-17, we find a much longer and more
involved version of the commandments, starting with “I am the Lord,
thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the
house of bondage.” This version seems to have been addressed to the
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851.
Id.
184
Id. at 852.
185
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The Court noted a finding
of the District Court that determined the displays in each county were functionally
identical. Id. at n.2.
182
183
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Israelites; moreover, it settled the question of the Sabbath by saying it is
on the seventh day (not Sunday but Saturday, starting at sundown on
Friday evening until sundown on Saturday evening, for people who
lived before clocks and standardized time zones). Also, note the choice
of the version of the Ten Commandments is from Exodus instead of the
somewhat different version found in Deuteronomy.186
In November 1999, the ACLU of Kentucky sued the counties seeking
an injunction against maintaining the displays because they violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.187 Before the district
court acted, the legislative bodies of both counties authorized an
expanded display and resolution with recitations that the Ten
Commandments were “‘the precedent legal code upon which the civil
and criminal codes of . . . Kentucky are founded[.]’”188
After argument, the district court entered a preliminary injunction
on May 5, 2000, directing that the displays be removed
“IMMEDIATELY[]”189 and enjoining county officials from erecting
similar displays.190 The counties responded by posting a third display
consisting of the Commandments and eight other framed documents of
equal size.191 Each document included a statement about its historical
and legal significance.192 The ACLU of Kentucky moved to supplement
the preliminary injunction to enjoin the new displays. As requested, the
trial court supplemented the original injunction, and a divided panel of
the Sixth Circuit affirmed.193
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the
preliminary injunction. In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, she noted:
“Given the history of this particular display of the Ten Commandments,
the Court correctly finds an Establishment Clause violation. The
186
See Deuteronomy 5:6–21. For discussion of the differences between the Exodus and
Deuteronomy versions of the Decalogue, see supra text accompanying notes 160–78. For
discussion of the different traditions for counting the Commandments, see supra text
accompanying notes 168–77. Based on the above discussion, the numbering and
translation used by McCreary and Pulaski counties seems to have embraced the Protestant
rather than the Roman Catholic or Jewish versions. The presence of “Thou” and “thy”
suggest that it is a heavily edited, vastly reduced version taken in small pieces from the
King James version.
187
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852.
188
Id. at 853.
189
ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 703 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
190
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 855.
191
Id. The other documents were copies of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star-Spangled Banner, the Mayflower
Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of
Lady Justice. Id. at 856.
192
Id. at 857.
193
ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2003).
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purpose behind the counties’ display is relevant because it conveys an
unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”194
She continued, “[While] [i]t is true that many Americans find the
Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs. . . . we do not
count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.”195
In Van Orden, the Court held by a 5-4 margin that a 6-foot high
monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments standing on the
grounds of the Texas State Capitol in Austin did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.196
Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for a plurality that included Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas; Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment by separate
opinion; and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, O’Connor, and Souter dissented
and filed three separate dissenting opinions.197
In a passage with which we have some difficulty, the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist198 described the Supreme Court case law on the
Establishment Clause as “Januslike, point[ing] in two directions[.]”199 He
continued with the observation, “One face looks toward the strong role
played by religion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s
history. . . . The other face looks toward the principle that governmental
intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious
freedom.”200
In the next passage, the Chief Justice managed to magically morph
the neutrality of non-establishment into a principle of not “disabling the
government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage[]”; he
stated it in the singular, as if all Americans share one religious
heritage:201
This case, like all Establishment Clause challenges,
presents us with the difficulty of respecting both faces.
Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 884.
196
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
197
Id. at 681.
198
See Charles Lane, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Dies, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at
A1 (discussing in detail the events that gave rise to the death of the late Chief Justice).
Chief Justice William Rehnquist died on the evening of Saturday, September 3, 2005,
during the Senate hearings on President Bush’s nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be an
Associate Justice of the Court. Id. Mr. Rehnquist had been receiving treatment for thyroid
cancer. Id.
199
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683 (plurality opinion).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 684. That Americans do not share one religious heritage seems patently obvious.
See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
194
195
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institutions must not press religious observances upon
their citizens.
One face looks to the past in
acknowledgment of our Nation’s heritage, while the
other looks to the present in demanding a separation
between church and state. Reconciling these two faces
requires that we neither abdicate our responsibility to
maintain a division between church and state nor evince
a hostility to religion by disabling the government from
in some ways recognizing our religious heritage[.]202
For this sweeping re-interpretation of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, the Chief Justice cited the little-noted 1952
decision of Zorach v. Clauson.203
There is substantial support for the position that government cannot
be hostile to any one religion or accommodate any one religion.
However, the last phrase, “by disabling the government from in some
ways recognizing our religious heritage,” deserves more analysis. A
critical reading of the Zorach decision lends no substantial support for
the proposition advanced by the Chief Justice that the First Amendment
does not prohibit the government from recognizing our religious
heritage.204
The Chief Justice acknowledged that various places in the nation’s
Capitol held replicas of Moses with the Ten Commandments including
three places in the Supreme Court building and grounds.205 The Chief
also observed that “simply having religious content or promoting a
message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.”206 He noted that the placement of the monument
on the Texas State Capitol Grounds was a fairly passive use of them.207
He concluded, “We cannot say that Texas’ display of this monument
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”208
The most important vote in the Van Orden v. Perry decision,
however, belonged to Justice Breyer, a Clinton appointee, who was the
decisive swing vote and wrote only for himself—reminiscent of Justice

Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683–84 (plurality opinion).
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
204
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 684 (plurality opinion). The Zorach decision, a 6-3 result with
Mr. Justice William O. Douglas writing for the majority, held that New York City’s decision
to release students to attend religious training on school days upon written request of the
parents did not violate the Establishment clause. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 306.
205
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion).
206
Id. at 690.
207
Id. at 692.
208
Id.
202
203
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Powell’s timeless and prescient position in Bakke v. Regents of University
of California in 1978.209 Justice Breyer opined that when one decides a
case under the First Amendment’s religion clauses one cannot apply a
mechanical test but “must refer . . . to the basic purposes of those
Clauses.”210 Those basic purposes, he wrote, are threefold: (1) to
“‘assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for
all[]’”; (2) to “avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes
social conflict[]”; and (3) to maintain “‘separation of church and
state.’”211
In Van Orden, Justice Breyer saw a “borderline case[]”212 that would
permit “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”213
After reviewing the physical setting and donative history of the display,
Justice Breyer wrote, “For these reasons, I believe that the Texas
display—serving a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose, not
primarily ‘advanc[ing]’ or ‘inhibit[ing] religion,’ and not creating an
‘excessive government entanglement with religion’—might satisfy this
Court’s more formal Establishment Clause tests.”214
Next, Justice Breyer portended that a contrary conclusion might light
the fires of hostility toward religion and “encourage disputes concerning
the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments” and
similar themes from public buildings.215 He further acknowledged the
danger of a slippery slope but said the case presented “only [a]
shadow[]” of the real dangers the First Amendment was designed to
prevent.216 He stated flatly that he disagreed with the plurality’s analysis
but that—for reasons all his own—he agreed with the result.217
D. Where the Individual Justices Stand
The seven Van Orden opinions and three McCreary opinions reveal
profound differences amongst the justices as to the proper role of
religion in American public life and as to the proper application of the
two religion clauses of the First Amendment. Let us review the
spectrum.

209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Scalia

Justice Scalia is on one extreme of the Court’s varied positions on
religious freedom. During oral argument in Van Orden, he stated that
the Ten Commandments are “a symbol of the fact that government
comes—derives its authority from God. And that is, it seems to me, an
appropriate symbol to be on State grounds.”218 He argued that the
Constitution does not mandate governmental neutrality between religion
and non-religion.219 Justice Scalia indicated that he would also repeal the
third prong of the Lemon test.220 According to the Justice “even an
exclusive purpose to foster” advancement of religion does not necessarily
make a display unconstitutional so long as people are not significantly
taxed or forced to observe the posting.221 In his concurring opinion in
Van Orden, Justice Scalia posited that a state should be able to favor
religion generally, engage in public prayer, or “venerat[e] the Ten
Commandments[]” without violating the Establishment Clause.222 The
Justice has criticized the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence by
accusing his colleagues of relegating religion to “some purely personal
avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in
the privacy of one’s room.”223 Though an avowed originalist, Justice
Scalia ignores the fact that some of the Framers of the Constitution
believed religion to be a purely private affair.224 Justice Scalia, therefore,
would appear to permit any public endorsement of religion as long as it
stops short of compelled worship under penalty of law.225 On the rare
occasion that Justice Scalia may concede that government may not favor
one particular religion over another, his concurrence in McCreary
suggests that this generosity only extends toward monotheistic
religions,226 seemingly contradicting the text of the Constitution itself.227

Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (No. 03-1500).
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220
Id. at 900.
221
Id. at 902.
222
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224
See supra Part II.A (noting Jefferson’s belief that religion should be a strictly private
and personal matter).
225
Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227
For a critique of Justice Scalia’s bias towards monotheism, see Michael C. Dorf, Does
the Constitution Permit Government To Favor Religion over Nonreligion? Justice Scalia Says Yes,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20080604.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
218
219
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Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas’s position mirrors that of Justice Scalia’s. But Justice
Thomas’s willingness to overrule 65 years of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence by un-incorporating the Establishment Clause as it applies
to the states merited mention by Justice Stevens, the ideological
antithesis of Thomas and Scalia, as “at least[]” facing the “problem head
on.”228
Justice Thomas believes that, in order “to abandon the inconsistent
guideposts”229 that the Supreme Court has established under the
Establishment Clause and “return to the original meaning of the
Clause[,]”230 the Supreme Court should reverse its course by holding that
the Establishment Clause is not incorporated against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.231 In the alternative, absent this complete
reversal, Justice Thomas would restrict the Establishment Clause to its
meaning in 1791, i.e., prohibiting state-mandated religious observance or
use of taxes in support of ministers of a denomination endorsed by the
state.232 Justice Thomas has not publicly discussed how to correct the
inaccuracies that may arise when the Justices fail as historians.233
3.

Chief Justice Rehnquist

Writing for the plurality in Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued for more tolerance of government sponsored speech in the area
of religion primarily because of “the strong role played by religion and
religious traditions throughout our Nation’s history.”234 The Chief
Justice’s opinion in Van Orden has been reviewed at length above.235 The
most troubling portions of his opinion are his reading of the
Establishment Clause as not reaching passive religious speech by
government and his finding that the Establishment Clause does not
disable the government from “in some [unspecified] ways recognizing
our religious heritage.”236
The concept of a singular religious heritage is fundamentally flawed.
A cursory surveillance of any U.S. military cemetery would reveal the
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 731 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring).
230
Id. at 693.
231
Id. at 694.
232
Id.
233
See David Savage, Supreme Court Finds History Is a Matter of Opinions, L.A. TIMES, July
13, 2008.
234
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683 (plurality opinion).
235
See supra Part IV.C (discussing the dimensions of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion).
236
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 684 (plurality opinion).
228
229
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presence of stone crosses and Stars of David237—evidence of, at a
minimum, two distinct religious heritages. And yet, in what ways has the
American government recognized a singular religious heritage? “In God
We Trust” was added to American coins at the suggestion of a
clergyman during the Union’s darkest days of the Civil War.238 Later,
“Under God” was added to the Pledge of Allegiance239 in response to
national hysteria generated by the “Red Scare” of the McCarthy era.240
The purpose, of course, had little or nothing to do with a religious
heritage241 and everything to do with “distinguishing” Americans from
the “Godless Commies.” Should we now leverage this disgraceful
period242 of our history to justify the infusion of more “God-talk” into
constitutionally-protected public discourse simply to please a vocal
minority who embraces evangelical Christianity?
4.

Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy was an active questioner during oral arguments in
Van Orden. He suggested that requiring a disclaimer with any display of
the Ten Commandants stating that the display is secular is “hypocritical”
because it “ask[s] religious people to surrender their beliefs and . . . is not
[a form of] accommodation.”243 He voted with Rehnquist, Scalia and
Thomas on both cases but did not write an opinion in either. As for the
McCreary decision, Justice Kennedy disassociated himself from Part I of
Justice Scalia’s dissent.244 Part I of Scalia’s dissent245 borders on
237
See, e.g., Burial and Memorial Benefits: Veterans Benefits & Services, http://www.
cem.va.gov/.
238
See Coin Symbols, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1907, at 8. On Feb. 12, 1873, Congress granted
the Secretary of the Treasury the approval to inscribe “In God We Trust” on U.S. coins. See
Coin Symbols, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1907, at 8. Id.
239
See President Hails Revised Pledge: He Endorses Congress’ Action in Inserting Words
‘Under God’ in Allegiance Vow, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1954, at 31. A joint Congressional
resolution passed on June 14, 1954 added the words “under God” to The Pledge of
Allegiance. Id.
240
Oxnam Cites Fight of Church on Reds: Says It Has Done More Than All Congress
Committees – Other Bishops Back Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 1953, at 10. Protestant church
bishops spoke out against the godless philosophy of Communists infiltrating America. Id.
241
See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 9,6871 (2004) for an excellent analysis of the error in the argument that “In
God We Trust” has lost religious meaning. One basic underlying problem with the
statement, as Professor Shiffrin so elegantly points out, is that “any English speaker knows
that ‘under God’ and ‘In God We Trust’ carry theological meaning.” Id. at 69. In short, it is
not true and other attempts to sidestep the problem are equally futile.
242
See ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).
243
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 220, at 11.
244
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245
Id.
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preferentialism when he advocates that the First Amendment does not
mandate governmental neutrality on religion246 and argues that historic
practices justify “disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned
deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”247 Parts II and
III, joined by Justice Kennedy, reject the extension of the scope (as Justice
Scalia sees it) of the principle that Government cannot favor religious
practices over non-religious practices and argues for a different result
based upon the Establishment Clause principles used by the majority.248
Justice Kennedy’s voting pattern, coupled with his previously authored
opinions in this area249 suggest that he may be the most moderate, or the
most undecided, of the block of four Justices permitting governmental
speech in the area of religion.
5.

Justice Breyer

Justice Breyer takes a moderate position in the two Ten
Commandments cases. He wrote separately, and provided the pivotal
vote to resolve Van Orden holding that the Texas display was
constitutional; Justice Breyer also provided the fifth vote in McCreary
concurring with Justice Souter’s majority opinion holding that the
Kentucky display was unconstitutional.
Justice Breyer expressed
exasperation with the conservative direction of the Court following a
critical affirmative action decision when he remarked in open court, “‘It
is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much,’” an
unusual observation not included in his written dissent.250 Because he
did not write his own opinion in McCreary, it is not possible to fully
detail his views; however, one can surmise that his doctrinal views may
not be substantially different than that of Justices O’Connor and Stevens.
In fact, he agreed with Justice O’Connor’s statement of principles in
McCreary but not how she applied them in Van Orden.251 It appears he is
in the middle—even if he leans left toward the governmental-neutrality
gang of four. Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Van Orden, detailed
above,252 suggests (maybe in our mildly reductionist manner) that he
Id. at 889.
Id. at 893.
248
Id. at 900.
249
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). This is a 5–4 decision holding that
allowing invocation and benediction prayers at public school graduation exercises violated
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion which was joined by Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter. Id. at 580–609.
250
Joan Biskupic, Roberts Steers Court Right Back to Reagan, USA TODAY, June 29, 2007, at
8A.
251
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
252
See supra Section III.C.
246
247
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would not disturb passive displays that have been up for decades—
thereby emphasizing his desire to avoid divisiveness.
6.

Justice Ginsburg

Justice Ginsburg is one of two justices who did not write a single
opinion in the Ten Commandments cases (Kennedy being the other one).
Justice Ginsburg, a Clinton appointee, was General Counsel to the ACLU
from 1973–1980 when she was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit.253 Because Justice Ginsburg voted with the block of four
in favor of governmental neutrality in the area of religious expression,
we will (somewhat arbitrarily) place Justice Ginsburg here in the
spectrum.
7.

Justice Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter

Unless one parses out sentences and weighs subtleties, it appears
there is not much difference between these three Justices—Stevens,
O’Connor, and Souter—insofar as their responses to the two Ten
Commandments cases are concerned. Though not advocates of a
complete “wall of separation” between church and state (as described by
Thomas Jefferson254), they are nonetheless opposed to governments’
endorsement of one religion over another through displays or other
types of speech.
E. The New Justices: After October 2005 Term
1.

Chief Justice Roberts

When William Rehnquist died on the night of September 3, 2005, the
Senate was holding hearings on the nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to
succeed Sandra Day O’Connor as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court.255 On Monday, September 5, 2005, President George W. Bush renominated Roberts to succeed William Rehnquist as Chief Justice.256
Roberts was then a sitting judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
where he had served since 2001.257 The author of 49 opinions while on
the D.C. Circuit, Mr. Roberts was seen as a “judicial minimalist.”258 He
253
See Biography of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/ginsburg.bio.html.
254
See Letter to Danbury Baptists, supra note 2.
255
Lane, supra note 198.
256
Jan Crawford Greenburg, Roberts Gets Nod as Chief, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 2005, at 1.
257
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., BIOGRAPHY, supra note 18.
258
Id.
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had clerked for Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1980–1981 after his graduation
from Harvard Law, where he had served as Managing Editor of the
Harvard Law Review.259
Chief Justice Roberts has sterling Republican credentials. After
clerking for Chief Justice Rehnquist, Roberts was hired as a special
assistant to the U.S. Attorney General (William French Smith), and then
as Associate Counsel to the President.260 He also served two years in the
first Bush presidency as Deputy Solicitor General.261 Evangelical
Christian groups greeted his nomination to the Supreme Court with
approval.262
While serving in the Reagan White House, Roberts was asked to
provide an opinion on a request for President Reagan to publicly
approve legislative efforts in Kentucky to require placement of “In God
We Trust” plaques in public schools.263 Roberts urged the President to
refrain from issuing such an approving message, writing that it was
“inappropriate” for the President to interfere with Kentucky’s legislative
processes and that “the President should not gratuitously opine on the
constitutionality” of legislation that implicates the Establishment
Clause.264 Anticipating his position on the Summum case, it is probably
fair to say that he may not be much different than his predecessor, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist. He will likely lean toward the conservative
side of the Court by voting to uphold the City of Pleasant Grove’s right
to limit public expression in city parks.
2.

Justice Alito

Associate Justice Samuel Alito was sworn in as the nation’s 110th
Supreme Court Justice on Tuesday, January 31, 2006 after being
confirmed by a mostly party-line vote of 58 to 42.265 Justice Alito was a
judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals when President George W.

Id.
Id.
261
Id.
262
See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Supreme Court Nominee John
G. Roberts: Why the Religious Right Likes What it Sees, http://blog.au.org/2005/07/21/
supreme_court_n/ (July 21, 2005).
263
Memo Regarding a Request to Support “In God We Trust” Plaques in Kentucky
Schools, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/roberts/roberts_
kentucky_schools.pdf.
264
Id.
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CNN, Alito Sworn In as Nation’s 110th Supreme Court Justice, (Feb. 1, 2006),
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Bush nominated him to the Supreme Court.266 Justice Alito succeeds
retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first woman appointed to the
Court.267 Justice Alito was confirmed by the closest vote since Justice
Clarence Thomas’s confirmation of 52 to 48 in 1991.268
In the Summum case, it is more than likely that Justice Alito will vote
with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts to find in favor of
Pleasant Grove. Jay Sekulow, representing Pleasant Grove, called Justice
Alito’s nomination a “grand slam.”269 Justice Alito’s decisions from the
Third Circuit on separation of church and state “fall squarely in the
conservative camp.”270 In 1999, he wrote an opinion finding that a citysponsored crèche and menorah did not violate the Establishment
Clause.271 In 2000, he authored a dissent in a case involving a
kindergarten student at a public school, who created a poster being
thankful for Jesus when students were asked to make posters depicting
what they were thankful for.272 Alito chastised the majority for not
addressing the constitutional issues raised by the case, and expounded
his conservative views in dicta.273 He quickly declared that displaying
the child’s poster does not raise any Establishment Clause problems
because “[t]he Establishment Clause is not violated when the
government treats religious speech and other speech equally and a
reasonable observer would not view the government practice as
endorsing religion.”274 He would hold that “discrimination based on the
religious content of speech is viewpoint discrimination.”275
The swing votes in the Summum case could belong to Justices
Kennedy and Ginsburg, the only two Justices who did not write opinions
on the so-called Twin Ten Commandments cases. Justice Breyer may be
a “wild card”—as he was in Van Orden. If Justices Stevens and Souter
stand resolute, they will need to strike common ground with Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy if they hope to garner five votes.
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V. THE SUMMUM, THE SEVEN APHORISMS, AND THE ROAD TO THE HIGH
COURT
In Van Orden, Justice Stevens presciently observed that there are
many different versions of the Decalogue, “ascribed to by different
religions[.]”276 The Summum, for example, believe that Moses felt the
Israelites were not ready to receive the Seven Principles of Creation
handed down by God to him, so he destroyed the tablets containing the
Seven Aphorisms, traveled back to Mount Sinai, and returned with a
second set of tablets containing the Ten Commandments.277 Therefore,
the Seven Aphorisms and the Ten Commandments are “two different
points of view on the same subject.”278 One of these “different” points of
view, however, has been silenced by Pleasant Grove through its denial of
Summum’s request to display its Seven Aphorisms next to a Ten
Commandments display.
Pleasant Grove is represented by the American Center for Law &
Justice (“ACLJ”) and its Chief Counsel, Jay Sekulow.279 “Founded by
televangelist Pat Robertson in 1990, the ACLJ has an annual budget of
$35 million and employs about 130 people, including 37 lawyers[.]”280
Sekulow describes himself as an aggressive litigator, driven by his own
faith as a Brooklyn-born Jewish convert to Christianity, and a member of
Jews for Jesus.281 After making his fortune in real estate tax shelters, he
signed on as general counsel for Jews for Jesus, and in that role helped to
craft the start of a revolution in First Amendment law, arguing that
public displays of piety were protected not by the Free Exercise Clause,
but by the Free Speech Clause.282
In 1987, Sekulow argued that a Los Angeles city resolution banning
leafleting by groups, including Jews for Jesus, at the Los Angeles
International Airport violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause.283 A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice O’Connor, agreed.284 In 1990, he used the free speech argument
again to advocate for the student’s rights to hold Bible club meetings
after-hours on school premises, and again the Supreme Court agreed.285
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments, http://www.summum.
us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml.
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He successfully used the same argument in a case involving the use of
public school facilities to show Christian films and the use of public
university funds to subsidize some student groups but not Christianbased groups.286 In 2007, he deployed an extension of the Free Speech
argument in successfully representing a pharmacist who refused to sell
Plan B, an emergency contraceptive the pharmacist considered
equivalent to abortion.287
Summum also comes before the Court on ostensibly free speech
grounds. After the Court’s decision in Van Orden, an Establishment
Clause challenge to Pleasant Grove’s policy on public displays at Pioneer
Park was duly dismissed.288 With that obstacle removed, the City next
turned its defense of its denial to Summum by referring to a policy called
“Criteria for Placement,” under which it would permanently display a
privately-donated monument if either the donated item has historical
relevance to the community, the donor is an established Pleasant Grove
civic organization with strong ties to the community, or has a historical
connection with Pleasant Grove City.289 In spite of the fact that at the
time the Fraternal Order of Eagles donated the Ten Commandments
statue to the city in 1971 the local chapter had only existed for two
years,290 and in spite of the fact that the Ten Commandments display
would not be endorsed by Mormons,291 the City cites its policy for
allowing the Fraternal Order of Eagles’s monument to stand while
rejecting the Summum monument. The arguments in the merit and
amici briefs, therefore, center around issues related to government
speech, public forums, and whether or not an outcome in favor of
Summum will result in a Statue of Tyranny being erected next to the
Statue of Liberty.292 Although not briefed by the parties, the Court could
also presumably, though it would be a stretch, revive its curious
“expressive association” doctrine, first announced in Dale, to posit that
forcing the City to permit the Summums to erect their monument would
violate the City’s free speech rights.293 We note simply that a win by
TOOBIN, supra note 282, at 94.
Anderson, supra note 280.
288
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Pleasant Grove will mean that any public Ten Commandments display
can easily withstand a First Amendment challenge, on either
Establishment Clause or Free Speech grounds.
The Sekulow game plan, then, is as follows. For any city in the
United States that wishes to display the Christian Ten Commandments
in a public space, to the exclusion of all other religious artifacts, the goal
is to remove the display from the realm of the Establishment Clause. If
Summum goes as planned and the Court finds in favor of Pleasant Grove,
any city seeking to erect a Ten Commandments display should adopt a
content-neutral policy that purports to consider for acceptance any
monument, regardless of its message, as long as the speaker of the
monument has longstanding ties to the city or community. Under these
criteria, the City can readily accept a Ten Commandments display,
claiming blithely it is not the message that matters, but the speaker.
Since the criteria for selection is content-neutral, a facial Establishment
Clause challenge to the display will fail. Once out of the realm of the
Establishment Clause, the only avenue of challenge left is the public
forum argument advanced by Summum. Assuming a favorable outcome
in Summum, the City needs only claim that the display, once donated to
the City (i.e., title of ownership of the display passes to the city), and that
the selection of the display itself (again, careful to avoid endorsing the
contents itself) is government speech and therefore no equal access rights
are granted to other speakers. The end result is a Ten Commandments
display, on public grounds, without any consideration of religious
motivation. If the strategy succeeds, it can easily be adapted and
deployed to inject other religious displays into the public sphere.
The Brief in Opposition contemplates this outcome in a footnote,
barely daring to suggest that the City’s strategy could be that daring: “It
is not the purpose of the First Amendment to ensure that governmental
entities remain free to disclaim speech as purely private when it suits
their Establishment Clause needs while simultaneously avoiding the
rules that generally govern the regulation of private speech.”294 The
facts, however, seem to plainly speak for themselves. Summum,
described by Sekulow as the “most significant” Ten Commandments
case in the Supreme Court’s history,295 is the logical next step in a multifaceted and choreographed attack on Jefferson’s Wall of Separation.
Even more appealing for the Roberts’s Court, with its purported sense of
“judicial modesty,” the result is achieved without overruling prior
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 10, at 32 n.9.
Videotape: Chief Counsel Jay Sekulow at the Supreme Court!, available at American
Center for Law & Justice, In the Courts: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2007),
http://www.aclj.org/Cases/default.aspx?Section=120.
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Establishment Clause precedents. Perhaps most importantly, McCreary
will be rendered impotent without a direct assault by the Roberts
Court.296 While this may evoke grumbling from Justice Scalia, surely
even he would be pleased with such an outcome.
VI. ROUSSEAU’S “CIVIL RELIGION” AND CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE SUMMUM
A leading scholar in sociology cited Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the
original source for the concept of a “Civil Religion.”297 In his essay on
“The Social Contract,” Rousseau argued for a civil religion with only five
(5) simple precepts, or dogmas if you prefer:
1. The existence of God;
2. The life-to-come;
3. The reward of virtue;
4. The punishment of vice; and
5. The exclusion of religious intolerance.298
Note that the Holy Bible is not on the list, and neither are Moses or
Jesus. However, religious intolerance is specifically excluded by
Rousseau’s civil religion. Also, a number of practices that concerned
members of the Court, such as opening prayer for Congress and printing
“In God We Trust” on our money, would come clearly within the
umbrella of Civic Religion, as proposed by Rousseau.
One reading of an episode in early U.S. history might support the
idea that the Founders embraced either a civic religion or the Public
Religion of John Adams, the second President.299 The initial request to
open every session of the Continental Congress with prayer was refused
until it was re-framed as a request by Sam Adams of Boston for an
essentially non-denominational prayer by a man of good character,
piety, and virtue.300 We have yet to make substantial inroads against

It is worth noting that the City’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not cite Van Orden
but does cite McCreary. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17. The same is true
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religious intolerance, particularly the current virulent prejudice against
the followers of Islam.301
Intolerance aside, one can see from Table 1.0 that Rousseau’s
proposed “civil religion” seems to fall roughly midway between the
“Publick Religion” of John Adams and the wall of separation endorsed
by both Thomas Jefferson and the father of the Bill of Rights, James
Madison. Civil Religion also has the advantage of more closely
paralleling the historical tracks in the relationship between State (U.S.
style) and Church.
Finally, we should note that the future demographics of the U.S.
seem to point to more, rather than less, diversity. One estimate is that
racial and ethnic minorities will make a majority of this country’s
population by 2042.302 This is not a good time to embrace John Adams’s
stance that leans toward a general Protestant Christian “Publick
Religion.” This was a stance, historically, that dogged both Jefferson and
Madison. It may have historically provoked their rather extreme stance
of separation. If we were to speculate, Madison and Jefferson might
have embraced the extremism of complete separation with an eye
toward a distant compromise that might have looked like Rousseau’s
civil religion.
Table 1.0

1.
2.
3.

Prayer at Inaugural &
Opening of Congress
Mention “God” on
coinage
“Praise to God” on
Washington Monument

Civil
Religion
(Rousseau)

“Publick
Religion”
(John
Adams)

Wall of
Separation
(Thomas
Jefferson)

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Arab-Americans Sue U.S. Over Re-Entry Procedures, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2006, at A12 (describing the events that have spurred the onslaught of
lawsuits by Arab-Americans alleging persecution and mistreatment by members of the
Department of Homeland Security and the FBI in a “climate of suspicion and fear”);
Marjorie Connelly, There’s Still a Chill in New York for Arab-Americans, Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2003, at CY5 (showing two-thirds of New Yorkers feel persons of Middle Eastern
descent are likely to be unfairly singled out); Jodi Wilgoren, Going by Joe, not Yussef, but Still
Feeling Like an Outcast, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A15 (discussing how Arab-Americans
in Detroit are facing racial discrimination).
302
Eli Saslow and Robert Barnes, In a More Diverse America, a Mostly White Convention,
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2008, at A1.
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(in Latin)
Any preferment of Judeo
– Christian tradition
5. Printing Masonic
symbols on paper
money
6. Leaving “under God” in
the Pledge of Allegiance
7. Texas Monolith
8. Kentucky posting of 10
Commandments in
Courthouses
9. Putting Bible quotations
up in federal buildings
10. Permitting a spirituality
festival with all
interested religious
groups having exhibits
at a state university
11. Putting a slogan “I
believe,” with Christian
cross on state license
plate
12. Allowing installation of
the Summum's Seven
Aphorisms in City Park
4.
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NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

We believe the better-reasoned position for the Court would be to
embrace the civil religion philosophy propounded by Rousseau and
elaborated for the American experience by Professors Robert Bellah303
and Henry Steele Commager.304 Such a position would reflect American
experience and again re-assert the ultimate principle of religious
tolerance, namely, that governments cannot prefer one religion to
another; neither can governments prefer religion to non-religion.
To endorse the concept of “ten” commandments is to prefer
Christianity to Judaism and religious tradition, and to promote “The
Decalogue” over rationalism. To argue that Pleasant Grove’s display of
the Fraternal Order of Eagles’ Ten Commandments in Pioneer Park is not

See Bellah, supra note 297.
Henry Steele Commager, Take Care of Me When I am Dead, 3 Free Inquiry (no. 3, 1983), in
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 331–36 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
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government endorsement of religion requires a suspension of common
sense. If a vandal spray-paints hate speech on the side of a business
building, it is graffiti and vandalism. If the business owner allows a
reasonable time to pass without removing the hate speech, he endorses it
implicitly and the hate speech becomes his. Similarly, if someone places
a yard sign on a neighbor’s property without the neighbor’s permission,
it is trespass to property. If the neighbor permits the sign to remain, the
neighbor then surely accepts and endorses the sign as his own. Even if
the purpose of erecting a Ten Commandments statue is secular, but the
objective result is the promotion of one religion over another by the
government, the First Amendment is violated just as surely as if the
intent had been otherwise. The secular versus religious purpose is a
chimera. It is a red herring to obscure the movement of our government
deeply into the area of religious speech and expression where it is
prohibited from going.
We conclude that there is no place in American society for a
governmental endorsement of the so-called Ten Commandments. They
are a minefield of problems under the First Amendment. Moreover,
leading scholars agree that ethics are independent of religion.305 As for
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s and Justice Scalia’s prostrating themselves
before the icons of “Religious Tradition” and majority religious
sentiments respectively, there is no substantial constitutional or
historical support for either. Religious tradition flies in the face of
American history and may be an attempt to resurrect John Adams’s
public piety. It must fail on the second front because, as Professor Witte
noted, Adams’s public piety (dominated by a strong leaning toward a
non-denominational Protestantism) requires a frontier as an essential
safety valve for non-conformists and free-thinkers. The frontier has
disappeared. The safety valve necessary for such public policy no longer
exists.
We believe that Justice Breyer’s concern about stirring religious fires
of discontent by taking down long-standing engravings of the Ten
Commandments might be met by “grand fathering” older public piety
displays. Such a prospective application of the wall of separation would,
in time, be dominant—without any need to sandblast every public
square in every county seat. The grandfathering proof could be used as
a defense to any Establishment contention, making the Summum decision
prospective only in application.

305

See JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 48–62 (4th ed. 2003).

638

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Louis Brandeis once said, “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.”306 We can assume that if the Summum possess
sufficient resources to litigate matters before the Supreme Court that
they can also utilize those resources to purchase billboards and land to
put up their Seven Aphorisms anywhere besides Pioneer Park. In
reality, what they seek in their petition is equal government
endorsement of the Seven Aphorisms and the Ten Commandments.
This unfortunate case is the logical outcome of government-sanctioned
religious expression. The twin 2005 Ten Commandments Supreme
Court decisions do not seem to be particularly helpful in getting our
country to “come to grips”—so to speak—with the social and political
tension between two usually well-intentioned groups, those who want
more religion in our public life and those who want less public piety in
our public life. In a sense, the decisions have prolonged the debate and
have postponed the day of reckoning.
Governmental posting of the Decalogue in public, as we have
demonstrated above, displays theological and Biblical ignorance, is
chauvinistic, and—ultimately—is divisive. A superior idea would be for
the Supreme Court to embrace Rousseau’s limited concept of a Civil
Religion. Religion is alive and well in the United States; and it neither
requires nor deserves any assistance or hindrance from the government.
However, some respect for tradition, as well as some awareness of our
current diversity, should support the Court to embrace Rousseau’s
limited Civil Religion and to eschew both John Adams’s “Publick
Religion” and Mr. Jefferson’s Wall of Separation.
The Court’s answer in Summum, if explicit and clear enough, will
provide guidance for lower courts as similar issues percolate. In South
Carolina, for example, a federal lawsuit has been filed against the state
legislature for adding a license plate option with the words “I Believe”
along with a Christian cross superimposed over a stained glass
window.307 Under our adoption of a civil religion standard, if South
Carolina decides to permit religious groups to exercise their free speech
rights on a license plate, then that right must be afforded to all other
religious groups on an equal basis. This result would be in line with
stare decisis and the Court’s longstanding jurisprudence on both free
speech and establishment clause jurisprudence. A contrary ruling in
Summum, however, holding that the government has no obligation to
306
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provide an equal voice to other religious organizations once it has
adopted one particular voice as its own, would upend those decisions.
Such an activist decision would no doubt please religious conservatives,
but the fallout of such a decision would be that South Carolina can offer
license plates that endorse only one religion over all others. The
torturous outcome would mean that under the First Amendment, free
speech protects Christians who wish to express their Christianity on
license plates to the exclusion of Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, atheists, and
yes, even Summums, while the free exercise clause protects no one.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in a recent opinion on affirmative action
that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”308 We observe the same may be said
of religious discrimination: The way to stop discrimination on the basis
of religion is to stop discriminating on the basis of religion. A ruling in
favor of Pleasant Grove in Summum may deal a fatal blow to the wall of
separation. At the very least, it would blast open a hole through which
government may endorse the most startling rise of public displays of
religiosity in well over a hundred years. A government that can endorse
the Protestant Ten Commandments over all other religious artifacts is a
government that can fine its citizens for not observing religious faith (a
fine for not celebrating Christmas, perhaps?). We urge otherwise.
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